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The eighth session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
convened recently in Geneva, Switzerland A major unresolved issue at the
Conference was the question of international regulation of deep seabed mi'-
ing In this article, Representative McCloskey and Attorney Losch discuss
U.S. interests in achieving a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty, the
sometimes conflicting objectives of other nations, and the effect that unilat-
eral action by the U.S. Congress to legislate deep seabed mining could have
on the successful completion of a treaty.
It .has been said that observing the Law of the Sea Conference is
like monitoring the progress of a glacier. However, in the last four
years, during only forty-one weeks of formal negotiations, substantial
progress has been made toward a general agreement on the great ma-
jority of traditional Law of the Sea (LOS) issues.' The deep seabed
* Presently serving sixth term as U.S. Congressman from the 12th Congressional District,
California; ranking minority member, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries;
Congressional Advisor to the U.S. Delegation at the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference; member,
California Bar; A.B., LL.B., Stanford University.
** Presently Deputy Minority Counsel to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee; designated Congressional Observer to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Sessions of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference; member, District of Columbia and Fed-
eral Bars; B.S., U.S. Coast Guard Academy; J.D., George Washington University.
I For a complete presentation of the issues under discussion at the Law of the Sea Confer-
The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference
1:240(1979)
mining issue represents a glaring exception which could cause the long
and tedious negotiating process to end in impasse. Philosophic differ-
ences, economic uncertainties, and a lack of trust, combined with the
existence of several interest alliances between the participants, have
prevented agreement on an international regime for exploitation of the
resources of the deep seabed.2 After successive unproductive negotiat-
ing sessions on this portion of the treaty, agreement on language ac-
ceptable to the U.S. Senate is now regarded as unlikely by most
members of the Congress who have followed the negotiations.3 More-
over, unilateral legislative action that will permit U.S. corporations to
proceed with deep seabed mining seems to be almost certain during
1979 or early 1980 in view of lobbying efforts by the mining industry.4
This legislation will have a significant international impact similar to
the effect of the unilateral action of the United States in establishing a
200-mile zone for fishing conservation.5 Passage of such legislation
may destroy the substantial progress that the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence has made to date.
UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
OF THE SEA TREATY
United States diplomats have traditionally believed that a success-
ful Law of the Sea treaty would provide for the following American
interests: 6
ence, see Swing, Who Will Own the Oceans, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 527 (1976). For the latest compre-
hensive analysis of the articles which command a consensus, see Oxman, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978).
2 For a discussion of these factors, see 123 CONG. REC. E5301 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977) (report
on U.N. Law of the Sea Conference by Rep. McCloskey); 122 CONG. REC. E5753 (daily ed. Oct.
26, 1976) (report on Law of the Sea Conference by Reps. McCloskey and Gilman, submitted by
Rep. Ruppe).
3 Because the terms of the Treaty are still the subject of negotiations and can change, mem-
bers of Congress are reluctant to go on the record regarding ratifiability of a treaty.
4 During hearings on deep seabed mining legislation, the representatives of the mining indus-
try testified that they need legislation to provide a stable investment climate. See, e.g., DEEP
SEABED MINING: HEARING ON H.R. 3350, 3652, 4582, 4922, 5624, 6784, AND 6846 BEFORE THE
SLBCOMM. ON OCEANOGRAPHY AND House COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 346-47 (1977). Such a climate would allow them to continue the large investments
necessary to develop deep seabed mining technology. Id. (statement of Milton Stem, Senior Vice
President, Kennecott Copper Corp.)..
5 Shortly after the passage of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified in scattered section of 5, 16, & 22 U.S.C.), 86 countries used
this precedent to make various assertions of jurisdiction over the waters off their coasts.
6 National Security Council Interagency Group for Law of the Sea, Review of United States
Interest in Law of the Sea (unpublished memorandum Mar. 16, 1978).
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(a) achievement of a dispute settlement mechanism under interna-
tional legal principles,
(b) protection of free navigation through straits and on the high
seas for commercial and military vessels,
(c) exploitation of non-living resources of the continental shelf and
the continental margin,
(d) access to the resources of the deep seabed,
(e) protection of the marine environment,
(f) management of the ocean's fisheries, and
(g) conduct of marine scientific research.
These interests, especially the achievement of a dispute settlement
mechanism, are of great importance to the United States. Their codifi-
cation in an LOS treaty would be consistent with traditional U.S. ad-
herence to a world order governed by international legal principles. In
contrast, unilateral U.S. legislation permitting deep seabed mining
would merely promote short-term profits in the nickel and cobalt mar-
kets for U.S. mining firms. To fully appreciate the U.S. interests which
might be affected by an LOS treaty, a brief discussion is useful.
First, a dispute-settlement mechanism under international legal
principles is a key goal of U.S. foreign policy. The establishment of
such a mechanism would foster a stable and predictable international
environment which would stimulate, reward, and protect capital invest-
ment.
Second, an LOS treaty would protect free navigation for commer-
cial and military vessels.7 In fact, the current text protects traditional
high seas navigational freedoms.8 On the other hand, recent develop-
ments, such as the unilateral assertions by individual nations concern-
ing control of passage through straits9 or within offshore boundaries,' 0
pose various threats to historic practices of freedom on the seas.
Specifically, these threats include: the assertion of territorial sea
boundaries beyond the U.S.-recognized three-mile limit, which could
7 For a comprehensive analysis of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text [hereinafter
cited as ICNT] articles relating to freedom of navigation, see Shelton and Rose, Freedom ofNavi-
gation: The Emerging International Regime, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 523 (1977).
8 Since the protection of freedom of navigation is one of the primary goals of the Conference,
provisions relating to that objective are contained in many of the articles under discussion. The
current basis of discussion is the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Fourth United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P.10 (1977), as supplemented by
informal reports to the Conference from the leaders of the negotiating sessions. Provisions relat-
ing to freedom of navigation include ICNT arts. 17-59, 86-96 and 193-234.
9 Singapore, Spain, Turkey, and other states bordering straits have suggested that the quality
of their environment must be protected and restrictions on the passage of vessels through straits
off their coasts may be required.
10 Costs Rica, Chile, Equador, and Peru have seized fishing vessels operating within 200 miles
of their coasts. Vessels which have been underway and not fishing have been seized.
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close more than 120 "international straits" formerly classified as high
seas under a three-mile territorial sea limit; the assertion of a 200-mile
jurisdictional limit over living resources, including the authority to re-
strict vessel operations to protect these resources; and, the assertion of
jurisdiction by "archipelagic" states over waters bounded by their out-
ermost islands allowing them to impose conditions on passage through
areas which have traditionally been considered part of the high seas. I I
The failure to include basic high seas navigational freedoms in an
LOS treaty would adversely affect U.S. economic interests. Foreign
trade may now be as important to our national security as naval
strength. The waterborne foreign commerce of the U.S. consists of
$240 billion worth of cargo per year.' 2 Onerous or discriminatory trade
regulations imposed by foreign nations would greatly increase the cost
of moving goods. The resulting increase would impair our ability to
market goods in foreign markets, increase the trade deficit, and raise
domestic consumer prices.
With respect to military security, our strategy of forward-based de-
ployment of forces is predicated on unimpeded passage by military and
commercial vessels and aircraft under and over the oceans. Such un-
impeded passage can be assured only through a uniform comprehen-
sive international treaty, or, in the alternative, through the exercise of
military force.
Third, while U.S. interests in non-living resources of the continen-
tal shelf are protected under existing international law,13 lack of agree-
ment in the current internationally-recognized delineation of the limits
of the continental shelf presents a serious issue. Past efforts to define
the limits of the shelf have resulted in ambiguity. For example, Article
1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf' 4 defines the shelf
as:
[the] seabed and subsoil of the submarine area adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said area.
This definition has become increasingly unclear in view of advanced
11 The Cook Islands provide an example of the additional jurisdiction an archipelagic island
nation may claim as a result of these new concepts. While the fifteen islands in the group have
only a land area of 149 square miles, they encompass 1.2 million square miles of ocean.
12 Projection for 1978, Maritime Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1978).
13 Under present international law, as set out in the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
entered inforce June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, a coastal state
has sovereign rights over the resources of the shelf. For a definition of the Continental Shelf, see
note 10 and accompanying text infra.
14 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 9.
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deep sea drilling technology.' 5 In order for U.S. mining corporations
to justify the significant capital investment necessary to explore the
continental shelf, a new internationally-recognized definition of the
shelf must be developed. The oil industry, for example, is greatly con-
cerned with the resolution of this issue because of the significant
amounts of oil beyond the generally recognized limits of the U.S. conti-
nental shelf. Although the present version of the treaty does not in-
cdude a precise definition of the outer limit of the continental margin, it
is likely that an agreement can be reached which would protect U.S.
interests.
Fourth, the establishment of an international regime for access to
the resources of the deep seabed is important to the U.S. for two rea-
sons. First, mining the seabed under international auspices avoids the
problems of parochial opposition faced by certain industries and activi-
ties. 16 For example, leaders of several developing nations have stated
that U.S. unilateral deep seabed mining operations would be in viola-
tion of international law. 17 In the absence of a treaty, our companies or
consortia cannot be certain that mining operations will be free from
disruption that could destroy their profitability. 18 Second, such an in-
ternational deep seabed regime could well serve as a specific model for
other forms of North-South economic institutions, 19 thus having a posi-
tive impact on our continuing efforts to achieve stable relationships
with the developing world.
Fifth, protection of the marine environment is becoming an ac-
cepted national priority. For example, last year's breakthrough in in-
ternational tanker safety standards set by the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization in London was ultimately re-
15 Only economics constrains deep sea drilling at this time. A National Science Foundation
study concluded that the Glomar Explorer, a research vessel built by the CIA for deep sea intelli-
gence operations, could drill a production well and install blowout preventers in waters up to
10,000 feet deep. Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling, The Future of Sci-
entific Ocean Drilling (1977), reprintedin 200 SCIENCE 1254 (1978).
16 For two examples of such parochial opposition, one need only look to the opposition to the
whaling industry vis-a-vis Green Peace or recall the local opposition in Japan and New Zealand
to calls by nuclear warships.
17 For a summary of the developing world's reaction to proposed unilateral action by U.S.
licensing of U.S. citizens to exploit the resources of the deep seabed, as well as the U.S. response,
see General Committee, Provisional Summary record of the 41st Meeting (closed), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/BUR/SR.41 (1978).
18 SCIENCE POLICY, RESEARCH, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND ECONOM-
ICS DIVISIONS, LIBRARY OF CONG., DEEP SEABED MINERALS: RESOURCES, DIPLOMACY, AND
STRATEGIC INTERESTS, 102-06 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LIBRARY OF CONGRESS REPORT].
19 Darman, Law of the Sea.: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373, 373-95 (1978).
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flected in U.S. legislation.20 By committing all countries to interna-
tional standards, an LOS treaty would maximize the chance that U.S.
waters will not be polluted by the ships and offshore activities of other
nations.
A sixth important U.S. interest that would be furthered by an LOS
treaty is the protection of living resources within the waters of the
world. The United States actively protects coastal fisheries within its
200-mile zone under the authority of the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.21 Equally essential to U.S. fisheries, how-
ever, is effective management and protection outside our 200-mile zone
and within the 200-mile zone of other nations.22 Specifically, salmon,
tuna, and shrimp, as well as whales and other marine mammals, can
only be protected if fishery protection extends beyond our 200-mile
limit. The U.S. interest in tuna provides a concrete example of the
need for such protection. Tuna range across most of the Pacific, and
are often most easily caught within the 200-mile limits of other coun-
tries. The U.S. distant water tuna fleet is the largest and most sophisti-
cated fleet in the world, and U.S. citizens consume about fifty percent
of the total world catch.23 A treaty based on the current text would
help protect our interests in tuna since it would establish principles of
regional management as well as equitable allocation of surplus stocks
to all fishing nations. These provisions are particularly important to
the U.S. because virtually all of the countries which followed our lead
in establishing 200-mile fishing zones declined to incorporate our ex-
emption for highly migratory species, and currently insist on control
over all vessels fishing for tuna within their 200-mile zones.24
A final U.S. interest that would be advanced by an LOS treaty is
marine scientific research. Such research in the oceans within 200
miles of other nations' shores is as important as any research we can
hope to conduct in our own waters. Even if a treaty were more restric-
20 See, e.g., Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (amending
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976)).
21 Note 4 supra.
22 Species in this category include tuna, salmon, and shrimp, which comprise 9, 15, and 22%,
respectively, of the total value of fisheries landed in the United States. NATIONAL MARINE FISH-
ERIES SERVICE, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1977).
23 Id.
24 Absurdly enough, U.S. fishermen are statutorily encouraged to trespass within the 200-mile
zone of other nations by government guarantees of compensation to boat owners whose ships and
catch are confiscated within those zones. Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-
1979 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 27, 1953, ch. 1018, §§ 1-9, 68 Stat. 883). The State
Department resisted repeal of this act in 1978, although freely admitting its inconsistency with our
new 200-mile laws.
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tive than past custom, it would still be preferable to the complete denial
of research within 200 miles of a nation's shores. Several developing
nations see this denial as one means of retaliation against a rich nation
which has chosen access to nickel and cobalt over an international
treaty.25 Although there seems no way to return to the scientific re-
search freedoms of former years, if treaty negotiations fall through,
marine scientific research may be even more restricted than if the cur-
rent draft language were accepted.
EARLY HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE
The roots of the current discussions can be traced back twenty
years to the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
which met in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1958.26 Concluding
seven years of preparatory work by the U.N. International Law Com-
mission, that Conference produced four conventions concerning the
uses of the oceans and their resources. These treaties, the Convention
of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,27 the Convention on
the High Seas, 28 the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, 29 and the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf,30 form the basis for current international oceans law.
However, the Conference failed to reach agreement on two key is-
sues-the breadth of a country's territorial sea and the breadth of its
fishing zone.
The third Conference, which is still in progress, was convened in
New York in December, 197331 after six years of preparatory work by
25 The coastal states which claim a 200-mile territorial sea (Chile, Equador, Peru, and others)
would certainly insist on an absolute right to control scientific research off their shores in the
absence of a treaty. If the negotiations fail because of U.S. unilateral action, those countries
would point to that fact in their denial of permission to U.S. scientists.
26 The second Conference was convened in Geneva in March 1960, in order to settle the re-
maining unresolved issues. [1960] U.N.Y.B. 542-44. It ended in failure after a compromise pro-
posal for a six-mile territorial sea, with an additional six-mile fishing zone, fell one vote short of
the two-thirds majority required for adoption. Id.
27 Entered in force Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
28 Entered in force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
29 Entered in force March 20, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
30 Entered in force June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311.
31 General Assembly Resolution 2750, G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 25,
U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970), provided that a third Conference on the Law of the Sea would be
convened in 1973 and instructed the Committee to undertake the preparatory work of the Confer-
ence. The Resolution directed the Committee to:
deal with the establishment of an equitable international regime-including an international
machinery-for the area and the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the area, and a broad
range of related issues including those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continen-
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the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.32 The Ad
Hoc Committee was elevated to standing committee 33 status in 1968,
and it met six times in 1969 and 1970. As a result of the Standing
Committee's reports, the General Assembly unanimously voted to ac-
cept the "common heritage of mankind" concept.34 General Assembly
Resolution 2749 (XXV) stated that the "seabed and ocean floor, and
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . .'. as
well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of man-
kind." 35 The declaration also provides that every state, "shall have the
responsibility to ensure that activities in the area. . . shall be carried
out in conformity with the international regime to be established. '36
In 1973, after six meetings, the Standing Committee submitted its
report to the General Assembly.37 Contrary to normal practice, how-
ever, the report did not include a proposed treaty text to serve as the
basis for a final negotiation. Instead, the report contained collections of
draft articles setting forth alternative texts and a comparative table of
proposals, a declaration, and working papers.3 8 As a result of the re-
port, the U.N. adopted General Assembly Resolution 3067 (XXVIII)39
setting the dates, functions, and locations for initial sessions of the third
tal shelf, the territorial sea [including the question of its breadth and the question of interna-
tional straits] and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high
seas [including the question of preferential rights of coastal states], the preservation of the
marine environment [including, inter alia, the prevention of pollution] and scientific research.
Id at 26.
32 This Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by Ambassador H. Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka,
was formed in 1967, G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doe. A/6716
(1967), after the U.N. Representative from Malta, Ambassador Pardo, called for the preparation
of a treaty that would reserve the seabed and ocean floor as the common heritage of mankind. 22
U.N. GAOR, C.A (1515th mtg.) I, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV (1967). Pardo believed that current and
future technological advances would "lead to a competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the
land underlying the world's seas and oceans, surpassing in magnitude and in its implications last
century's colonial scramble for territory in Asia and Africa." Id. at 12. He also believed that this
international struggle would: (1) result in inequitable allocation of food, fuel, and mineral re-
sources; (2) have a negative impact on land-based mineral resource producers; (3) increase the use
of the seabed and ocean floor for military purposes and intensify the arms race in the deep ocean
area; and (4) result in increased pollution, including radioactive pollution, of the marine environ-
ment. Id. at 2-14.
33 In 1971, the Standing Committee reorganized itself into three subcommittees, the first of
which was directed to address the seabed mining issue. For a description of the jurisdiction of all
three subcommittees, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 18.
34 G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doe. A/8097 (1970).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 25.
37 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 18.
38 Id. at 23.
39 G.A. Res. 3067, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 13, U.N. Doc. A/9278 (1973).
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Conference 40 in 1973, 1974, and 1975.
RECENT EFFORTS OF THE THIRD LOS CONFERENCE: THE
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT
There have been seven sessions of the Third LOS Conference4' to
40 The mandate of the Conference was to:
adopt a convention dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea, taking into account
the subject-matter listed in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2750 C (XXV) and
the list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea formally approved on 18 August
1972 by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction and bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.
G.A. Res. 3067, supra note 39, at 14.
41 At the outset of the first session, Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the
Seabed Committee, was elected President of the Conference by acclamation. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/SR.1-13 (1973); [1973] U.N.Y.B. 44-46. It was also decided that the work of the Conference
would be patterned after the Seabed Committee organization:
Committee I -International regime for the seabed and ocean floor beyond national juris-
diction.
Committee II -Territorial sea, contiguous zone, straits used for international navigation,
continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, coastal state preferential rights
to resources beyond the territorial sea, high seas, land-locked countries,
rights of shelf-locked states or states with narrow shelves or short coastlines,
rights of states with broad shelves, archipelagos enclosed or semi-enclosed
seas, artifical islands and installations, regime of islands.
Committee III-Preservation of the marine environment, scientific research, development
and transfer of technology. Id.
Also during this session, the Conference leadership positions were filled. Id. The United
States was elected to fill one of the thirty Vice-Presidencies and was appointed a member of the
Drafting Committee. Id. The final agenda item for the first session was the adoption of the rules
and procedures for the Conference. Id. Discussions of this topic were not completed by the end
of the session. Id. The second session, held in Caracas from June 20 to August 29, 1974, com-
pleted the adoption of the rules of procedure. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.I/Add.1 (1974);
[1974] U.N.Y.B. 71-84. The third session, held in Geneva, Switzerland, from March 17 to May 9,
1975, marked the commencement of substantive negotiations. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9;
[1975] U.N.Y.B. 116-32. During the session, the President of the Conference asked the Chairman
of each Committee to prepare an Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) covering the subjects
entrusted to his Committee. Id. The President stressed that the SNT should take into account all
of the formal and informal discussions held, should be informal in character, should not prejudice
the position of any delegation, the status of proposals already made, or the right to submit amend-
ments or new proposals, and should serve as a procedural device and provide a basis for further
negotiation. Id.
The First Committee portion of the document generally favored the position of the develop-
ing countries, and was criticized by the United States and other industralized countries. Id. at
120-22. The Second and Third Committee texts, while incomplete, were generally acceptable to
most delegations. Id. at 122-24.
The fourth session of the Conference was held in New York from March 15 to May 7, 1976;
its purpose was to revise the SNT in an attempt to move closer to a package commanding
consensus. The resulting Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT)-U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. I and A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev. 1-drafted by the Committee Chairmen,
was issued on the last day of the session. In this revision, the Commitee I text favored the position
of the industralized countries. Because of its last minute issuance, however, no criticisms of the
text were heard. The sections concerning Committee II and II1 were further refined.
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date, and each had an impact on the progress of the Conference. How-
The fifth session of the Conference was held in New York from August 2 to September 17,
1976. The bulk of the session, especially in Committee I, was devoted to charges by the develop-
ing countries that the industralized countries had resorted to secret procedures, outside the rules of
the Conference, in order to influence the details of the Committee I RSNT. A stalemate resulted,
and no new texts were drafted during the session.
The sixth session of the Conference was held in New York from May 23 to July 15, 1977. In
an effort both to break the deadlock which had developed during the fifth session and to produce a
series of new proposals on the major seabed issues, a preparatory meeting was held in Geneva
from February 28 to March 11, 1977. That meeting, under the Chairmanship of Minister Jens
Evensen of Norway, produced several unofficial proposals. These proposals were the focus of
discussion in Committee I during the session, the first three weeks of which were devoted exclu-
sively to the discussion of Committee I issues. After the first three weeks, all three Committees
continued negotiations on the unresolved issues.
The product of the session was the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),
A/CONF.62/WP.10 and Add. 1. Each section was written by the appropriate Committee Chair-
man and was based on his assessment of what might improve the possibility of consensus. How-
ever, the Committee I text did not reflect the negotiations conducted under the Chairmanship of
Minister Evensen and included unnegotiated provisions which favored the views of the develop-
ing countries. This unexpected outcome caused considerable concern among the Conference dele-
gates, especially those from the industrial countries. After the close of the session, Ambassador
Richardson issued a press release, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 389 (1977), characterizing the text as
"fundamentally unacceptable" and suggesting that the United States "undertake a most serious
and searching review of both the substance and procedures of the conference."
The ICNT provisions concerning Committee II and III issues were refined to the point where
the majority of the provisions represented consensus positions. For the first time, the text included
compromise language which offered a formula for the width of the territorial sea (12 miles) and
the width of a fisheries zone (188 miles beyond the territorial sea) while protecting traditional
navigational freedoms. Although Ambassador Richardson criticized the Committee I portion of
the ICNT, his press statemented noted the "real progress of vital issues relating to international
security and freedom of navigation." 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 389 (1977).
During the seventh session, the Conference held two meetings. The first convened in Geneva
and met from March 28 to May 19, 1978. The second meeting was held in New York from August
21 to September 15, 1978. Much of the time at the spring session was spent discussing the Confer-
ence procedure which has allowed a Committee Chairman to make changes in the text which did
not accurately reflect the trend of the negotiations. This discussion was prompted by Chairman
Engo's changes in the RSNT which did not incorporate Minister Evensen's work into the ICNT.
Many delegates believed Chairman Engo changed the text for political purposes and acted in bad
faith. It was ultimately agreed, however, that Committee Chairmen should retain a broad degree
of discretion over textual changes. The debate reflected both the frustration of the industralized
countries with the production of the ICNT and the skepticism of the developing countries who
believed they had been ignored when the RSNT was issued.
Following lengthy debates, seven informal "Negotiating Groups" were formed to deal with
specific "hard core" issues. Three dealt with seabed issues, two with the question of rights of
landlocked and other states to fish in the economic zone of a coastal state, one with the issue of
boundary delimitation between states, and the last with the question of a coastal state's rights and
duties with respect to continental shelf resources. The composition and jurisdiction of these
groups is spelled out in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/62. The Geneva meeting ended without the issu-
ance of any revised texts, but the Chairman of each Negotiating Group did issue an informal
report.
The work undertaken during the spring meeting was resumed at the summer meeting, with
special emphasis on the seabed issues. Although no revisions of the text resulted from the second
meeting, informal papers were again issued by the Negotiating Group Chairmen. At the close of
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ever, the single most important event occurred during the second ses-
sion when the rules of procedure were adopted. 42 This event was the
adoption of the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement. '43 This rule, origi-
nally formulated by the General Assembly specifically for the Confer-
ence, is the principle under which all the negotiations are conducted.
The rule provides as follows:
Recognizing that the Conference at its inaugural session will adopt
its procedures, including its rules regarding methods of voting and bear-
ing in mind that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and
need to be considered as a whole and the desirability of adopting a Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea which will secure the widest possible ac-
ceptance.
The General Assembly expresses the view that the Conference
should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by
way of consensus; that there should be no voting on such matters until all
efforts at consensus have been exhausted; and further expresses the view
that the Conference at its inaugural session will consider devising appro-
priate means to that end.44
This procedural rule, stressing the need for a comprehensive
treaty, requires that negotiations continue until a complete treaty, ac-
ceptable to all parties, is concluded. Since no issue is laid to rest until
all articles are acceptable, the rule results in protracted negotiations.
The rule does ensure flexibility, however, because the parties are not
required to go on record on each issue. This procedure allows the par-
ties to reach compromises in some areas while protecting more impor-
tant national interests in other areas without having specific
concessions highlighted by a substantive vote. The United States and
U.S. corporations interested in deep seabed mining must keep in mind
that lengthy, and often frustrating, negotiations are a result of the
"Gentlemen's Agreement." Although it may appear that unilateral
U.S. legislation will resolve certain issues, it may destroy much of the
progress reached so far and undermine U.S. credibility as a nation con-
cerned with interests other than its own.
REGIONAL AND INTEREST GROUP ALLIANCES AT THE CONFERENCE
One of the developments in the Conference has been the organiza-
this meeting, the Conference agreed to reconvene in Geneva on March 19, 1979, to sit for eight
weeks, the first three of which would be devoted exclusively to seabed issues. Delegates agreed to
consider a second meeting later in the year in the event that a proposed final treaty text could be
formalized at that time. The objectives and procedures for the eighth session are contained in
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/69.
42 28 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 40) 1, 4, U.N. Doc. A/9278 (1973).
43 Id.
44Id.
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tion of groups of countries along regional or special interest lines. A
major consequence of this development has been the increased frag-
mentation of nations into voting blocs. This fragmentation, in light of
the "Gentlemen's Agreement," increases the likelihood of protracted
negotiations. The regional groups, the Latin American Group, the
Asian Group, the Africian Group, the Western-European and Others
Group, and the Eastern-Europe Group, exert their greatest influence
over procedural issues. Regional groups do not exert a strong influence
over substantive issues since most of those issues are based on interests
which cross regional lines. The exceptions to this rule are those issues
which require regional cooperation, such as management of migratory
fish or marine environmental protection regimes. Alliances based on
common interests, either economic, philosophic, or political, are the
most effective alliances at the Conference. Such alliances include the
Group of 77, the industralized countries, the landlocked and the geo-
graphically disadvantaged states, the straits states, the broad margin
group, the archipelagic states, the land-based producers, and the
coastal states.
The Group of 77 (G-77) is a coalition of over 115 "third world"
developing countries.45 It is the largest, best organized, and most cohe-
sive of the interest groups in the Conference. The group caucuses
before and during Conference sessions, and uses a consensus procedure
to develop positions on the major issues under discussion. The G-77
includes resource and capital rich countries, such as Saudi Arabia, as
well as countries with vast untapped resources and limited capital such
as Brazil and Zaire. It includes some of the world's poorest countries
with no resources, no capital, and widespread social, economic, and
political problems, such as Bangladesh and Upper Volta. In addition,
conflicting interests within the group based on geographical location,
e.g., landlocked versus coastal states, or political philosophies, result in
group positions which often focus on general political goals rather than
specific LOS issues. These goals are often tied to other international
goals, such as the establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der (NIEO) which advocates the transfer of wealth and technology
from the developed countries of the "North" to the developing coun-
tries of the "South." This has been, and continues to be, a major goal
of the G-77 during the negotiations.
45 Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, a moderate, is the current chairman of the group.
Nandan and other moderates, including delegates from Kenya, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and Indone-
sia, have recently taken an active role in the group's deliberations and, as a result, the positions
taken by the group have become less strident and politicized.
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The G-77 is a significant force which demands recognition because
it represents a two-thirds numerical majority. If the "Gentlemen's
Agreement" procedure breaks down and individual issues are put to a
vote, the G-77 would be able to rewrite the treaty, unravel the com-
promises, and politicize the provisions, thus destroying all progress.
The industralized nations form a second interest alliance. The de-
veloped countries in this group possess the technology required to mine
the deep seabed and have a major interest in the maintenance of free
navigation on the high seas for military and commercial purposes. The
group is not well organized. While the members do communicate their
concerns to one another, they do not meet as a body and do not de-
velop consensus positions for presentation by a spokesman. This disor-
ganization is a result of the social, legal, and political differences
among group members. Key members of this group include: the
United States, the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, Japan, Belgium, and Canada.
A third interest alliance is made up of the landlocked and the geo-
graphically disadvantaged states (LL/GDS). This group includes those
countries which do not have direct access to the high seas or whose
economic zone is severely restricted in size because of neighboring eco-
nomic zones. The group, claiming a membership of over fifty-a
"blocking third"-was organized at the instigation of several developed
countries. They hoped that the LL/GDS group, cutting across devel-
oped/developing country lines, would counter-balance the countries in
the G-77-primarily the Latins-who were seeking sovereign rights in
a 200-mile zone off their coasts. The group has been successful in nego-
tiating a regime which will give its members access to surplus fisheries
in the region's economic zones and provide for a dispute settlement
procedure if they are denied such access. 46 While these provisions are
not a part of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, they will prob-
ably be included when it is revised. The landlocked countries in the
group have also been successful in negotiating a regime for access to
the oceans.47
The group has been effective because its members have a strong
common goal of access to the oceans and their resources. In addition,
the rest of the Conference recognizes that this group could block a
treaty if its interests are not accommodated.48 Members of the
46 Informal Negotiating Group Document NG4/9/Rev. 2, ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 62, 69,
70.
47 ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 124-132.
48 Conference procedures, including the "Gentlemen's Agreement," make it quite simple for a
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LL/GDS group include Austria, Nepal, Singapore, Paraguay, and
Cuba.
The straits states constitute a fourth alliance. This group includes
those countries that border straits which are open under existing three-
mile territorial sea limits, but which may be closed, thereby becoming
part of the territorial sea of the bordering state, under the proposed
twelve-mile territorial sea limit. Countries in this group include Spain,
Morocco, Singapore, Indonesia, and Yemen.
While passage through straits is a critical issue to the major mari-
time countries, a regime satisfying their interests has been negotiated
and seems to have general support. 49 However, the straits states are a
small minority and have not been able to develop support for a renego-
tiation of the regime.
Another alliance is the broad margin group. This group includes
those countries with continental shelves that extend beyond their coasts
by at least 200 miles. Key participants in this group include Australia,
New Zealand, India, Ireland, and the United States. The group is in-
terested in maximizing its jurisdiction over the non-living resources of
the shelf. The key problem with this issue is the establishment of clear
criteria for shelf limits which provide certainty and have geomorpho-
logical justification. Although the alliance has agreed on a formula
which would solve its political requirements, countries which do not
have broad margins or which do not want to give broad resource rights
to others have blocked adoption of the formula. The Soviet Union and
the Arab group have offered counterproposals to the group's formula,50
thereby compounding the problem of achieving consensus:
The archipelagic states alliance includes countries which are com-
posed of chains or groups of islands such as Indonesia, the Philippines,
the Bahamas, Fiji, and Papua-New Guinea. They are keenly interested
in adopting provisions which would give them the right to establish
large group (at least 30-50) of determined countries to block a treaty. This could be accomplished
by: objecting to the formulation of articles on the ground that no consensus has been reached,
offering a series of amendments during finalization of the text, calling for votes on individual
matters and amendments, long statements on the floor, or voting against finalization of the text.
The effectiveness of any of these procedural tactics would depend on the cohesiveness of the
group, and whether the Conference leadership believed there was sufficient support to override
their objections and still have the necessary two-thirds for final approval.
49 ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 34-44.
50 These proposals were floated during the seventh session. The Soviets proposed that any
shelf which extended beyond 200 miles be cut off at its limit (undefined) or at 300 miles, which-
ever was shorter. The Arab group, perhaps to keep as much offshore oil in international hands as
possible, rather than in the hands of their competition, proposed to limit all coastal state jurisdic-
tion to 200 miles.
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jurisdiction over all activities which occur within the area bounded by
their outermost islands. With the help of the major maritime countries,
this group has been successful in establishing a regime which satisfies
its resource interests but does not infringe on traditional high seas free-
doms within its economic zones.5 1
The land-based producers' alliance includes those countries which
are current or potential producers of the minerals that will be extracted
from the deep seabed. The group consists of developed as well as de-
veloping countries, and includes the Soviet Union, Chile, Zaire, Cuba,
Canada, and Papua-New Guinea. These countries want to ensure that
deep seabed mining does not adversely affect the profitability of their
current or future land-based mining. The group has been successful in
having a deep seabed mining production control mechanism inserted in
the ICNT to protect its interests.52
A final interest alliance is that of the coastal states. This group
includes those nations which seek sovereign rights in the 200-mile zone
off their coasts. It is composed primarily of those Latin American
countries which have made 200-mile territorial sea claims. Key mem-
bers of this group include Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. During
the sixth session, these countries, after extensive negotiations with the
LL/GDS group regarding rights in the 200-mile economic zone,
reached an agreement on this issue.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONFERENCE
Conference procedures have had a significant impact on the pro-
gress of the negotiations. The procedure outlined in the "Gentlemen's
Agreement" has allowed the Conference leadership to avoid putting
issues to a vote, thereby reducing the risk of a "tyranny of the major-
ity." In the course of exploring all possible methods of achieving con-
sensus, parties have ample time and flexibility to seek compromises,
make trade-offs, and achieve the "package" of agreed proposals. This
process, while time-consuming, offers a better chance of achieving a
generally acceptable, comprehensive treaty than would a procedure
which required votes on each issue. Other significant procedures in-
clude the use of negotiating texts as the basis for discussion and the
committee chairman's authority to make textual revisions that reflect
his personal assessment of the emerging consensus.
In 1975, frustration over the slow pace of the U.N. proceedings led
5 t ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 46-54.
52 Id. art. 150.
The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference
1:240(1979)
the United States to consider unilateral declaration of a 200-mile
fisheries zone.53 After initial resistance, the Administration gave in to
public and congressional impatience and indicated that it would accept
a properly-drafted bill.54 At the time, a number of observers, including
the authors, warned that U.S. unilateral action could undermine the
LOS negotiations. Thesame series of events took place in 1978, when
the Carter Administration took parallel action -in the wake of inade-
quate conference progress. 55
The enactment in 1975 of the Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act 56 established a 200-mile fisheries zone. Within two years,
eighty-six other countries had made varying claims with respect to
fisheries off their coasts. Action by the United States and these eighty-
six states had the effect of limiting their options at the Conference be-
cause each was bound by the expression of its national policy as mani-
fested in its unilateral actions. Shortly after the action by the United
States, the fisheries management regime under negotiation at the Con-
ference commanded a consensus, and no further negotiations concern-
ing those provisions were scheduled. Specifically, the regime
established in the ICNT differs from the regime established by U.S.
legislation in that the United States did not assert jurisdiction over
highly migratory fish, such as tuna, which are within 200 miles of our
shores, while the regimes established in the ICNT and eighty-three of
the eighty-six other countries do assert such jurisdiction. United States
policy is that highly migratory fish-those that may pass through the
fishing zones of many countries during their life spans-can be man-
aged effectively only by a regional organization. Since few tuna ever
come within 200 miles of the United States, the U.S. policy appears to
be self-serving, and its position on tuna is not likely to be adopted.
Unilateral action by the United States had several unintended and
adverse impacts. First, it preempted debate over what kind of fisheries
regime should be established. Second, it foreclosed the possibility of a
53 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-256, 90 Stat. 331
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 16, & 22 U.S.C.).
54 This position was never formally presented to Congress; however, the lack of a strong lob-
bying effort by the Administration against the bill, the failure of the President to exercise his veto
power, and the "Statement by the President upon signing H.R. 200 into Law" dated April 19,
1975, indicated the Administration's acceptance of the measure.
55 The Administration's opposition to a bill was dropped in October 1977, after the sixth ses-
sion of the Conference resulted in deep seabed mining provisions which were "not openly arrived
at" and "fundamentally unacceptable" to the United States. Statement by Ambassador Elliot L.
Richardson, Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference at the
United Nations, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 389 (1977).
56 Note 49 supra.
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regime which would have given the United States a voice in the re-
gional management of tuna and a role in the allocation process. Fi-
nally, the U.S.'s special exemption for tuna has been interpreted as an
act of bad faith with consequent damage to its international credibil-
ity.5 7
Another U.S. activity conducted outside the Conference has had
an unfortunate impact on the negotiations. Use of the Glomar Ex-
plorer to engage in covert military activities for the CIA, and the offi-
cial explanation that the Glomar was engaged in private scientific
experiments, was used as a justification for treaty language permitting a
coastal state to grant or withhold its consent to any scientific research
conducted off its coasts. The stated purpose for the measure was to
permit the nation to protect its internal security or to prevent foreign
commercial interests from secretly obtaining information regarding the
potential of its economic zone resources. Distrust and suspicion sur-
rounding CIA ocean activity were complementary to the distrust en-
gendered by apparent U.S. manipulations of the deep seabed treaty
language.
Even though the United States' enactment of the 200-mile fishery
zone law did not end LOS negotiations, it seems likely that unilateral
deep seabed action could. Although such legislation has been intro-
duced in each session of Congress since 1972, it was only after the
Carter Administration dropped its opposition in mid-1978 that a deep
seabed mining bill finally reached the floors of the House and Senate.
On July 26, 1978, before the second meeting of the seventh session, the
House of Representatives passed a deep seabed mining bill5 8 by an
overwhelming margin after learning of White House support for the
measure.
The response of the negotiating nations to passage of the bill was
prompt. Speaking for the G-77, Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji
condemned the proposed U.S. action, stating that it would "prejudice
negotiations and would have a negative impact on them." 59 The G-77
argued that such unilateral legislation would be "an exercise of sover-
57 Fisheries Disputes Threaten U.S. Relations in South Pacfc, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 25, 1978, at
A-5. See also Tiny Pacfic Islands Assert Their Claim to Much of Ocean, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1978,
at 1, col. 1. In a recent interview regarding the establishment of a regional management authority
by the group of South Pacific Island nations, the Fijian prime minister, Sir Kamisese Mara, said
that because the U.S. did not recognize the sovereignty of coastal states over highly migratory
species like tuna, America was not welcome to participate in the negotiations. He concluded by
saying that the U.S. attitude "stuck in my throat."
58 H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 7341 (1978).
59 109th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations Third Conference of the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.105 (1978) (Provisional).
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eignty," and "incompatible" with the Conference's Declaration of Prin-
ciples and "wholly illegal." 60
Although the United States was committed to the conclusion of a
broadly acceptable treaty at the earliest possible date, it also had an
obligation to encourage the development of deep seabed mining tech-
nology even while an international regulatory regime was being negoti-
ated. Ambassador Elliot Richardson explained that the Carter
Administration's position was prompted by the need for interim legisla-
tion to allow technological development to go forward. 61 He noted that
the slow pace of the Conference was jeopardizing technological devel-
opment that would benefit all nations, not just the United States.62
Ambassador Richardson was more restrained than he might have been.
He, and undoubtedly the Administration as well, had reluctantly
reached the conclusion that the only deep seabed provisions acceptable
to the G-77 would not be ratified by the U.S. Senate in treaty form.
Congress recessed on October 15, 1978, without House and Senate
agreement, but discussion of the House's action continued in the U.N.
General Assembly after the LOS Conference session concluded. 63
During the general debates, forty-four delegations, including one de-
veloped country, Norway, deplored the United States' position.64 Only
one nation, the Federal Republic of Germany, spoke in support. 65
CURRENT STATUS
As previously noted, the majority of the issues under discussion at
the Conference have the consensus support described by the "Gentle-
men's Agreement." In most cases, language reflecting this consensus
has been incorporated into the ICNT, although several compromise
packages which were negotiated during the most recent session have
only been spelled out in informal documents drafted by Committee or
Negotiating Group Chairmen. These documents, however, have been
presented to the Conference as reports, and can be expected to be in-
60 Id. For a summary of the reactions to G-77, as well as other countries, see U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/BUR/SR.41 (1978).
61 Statement by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, Special Representative of the President for
the Law of the Sea Conference, to the Plenary Meeting (Sept. 15, 1978).
62 Id.
63 U.N. Secretariat unofficial summary of the main points pertaining to Law of the Sea in the
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corporated into the revised ICNT during the eighth session, which
commenced in March, 1979.
If no unforeseen event upsets these compromises, the following is-
sues can be resolved: the limits of the territorial sea,66 the limits and
the rights and duties of all states in an "economic zone" for living re-
sources, 67 an international regime for marine environmental protec-
tion,68 the rights and duties of all states and of their commercial and
military vessels and aircraft in and over all ocean zones, 69 the rights of
landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged" 70 states to the living
resources within their region,71 and the settlement of disputes regarding
the living resources within a country's economic zone. 72
In addition to the major problems of deep seabed mining, a few
other unresolved issues remain: the limits of a coastal state's jurisdic-
tion over continental shelf resources and the establishment of a system
of revenue sharing for exploitation of the continental margin where it
extends beyond the economic zone,73 the rules concerning the conduct
of marine scientific research within a country's economic zone or on its
continental shelf,74 and dispute settlement regarding boundaries be-
tween opposite and adjacent states.75 With respect to the first two of
these issues, outlines for the final compromises are on the table. Reso-
lution will depend on agreement by a few key states to final compro-
mise formulas.76 Although it is not likely that the boundary issue can
be fully resolved, given the bipolar nature of boundary disputes, 77 a
scheme to approach the resolution of boundary disputes will likely be
66 ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 3-16, 47, 48.
67 Id. arts. 47, 48, 55-75.
68 Id. arts. 193-238.
69 Id. arts. 2, 17-45, 49-54, 86-132.
70 The precise definition of which states should be considered geographically disadvantaged
has not been finalized.
71 ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 62, 69, 70.
72 Id. arts. 296-97.
73 Id. arts. 76-85.
74 Id. arts. 239-66.
75 Id. arts. 74, 83.
76 At the seventh session, the Soviet Union offered a new formula for the limits ofjurisdiction
over the continental shelf which was inconsistent with that supported by a majority of the inter-
ested states. The Soviets will have to withdraw their proposal or convince the other interested
states of the merits of their proposal before an agreement can be reached. Regarding scientific
research, the United States is virtually alone opposing the regime established in the ICNT. United
States objectives will have to be satisfied or dropped before this issue can be considered resolved.
77 There are two primary rules for delimiting boundaries between opposite or adjacent coun-
tries. One calls for the application of "equitable principles"; the other uses an "equidistance" or
"median line" standard. The key issue in most boundary disputes is which rule should be applied.
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agreed upon and incorporated into the revised ICNT.78
While the foregoing analysis permits restrained optimism for a
successful conference, a brief review of the unresolved deep seabed
mining problems7 9 reverses the picture. The following issues are out-
standing: terms for the transfer of technology and expertise to the
international community (transfer is bitterly opposed by U.S. compa-
nies), limitations on mineral production from the seabed to avoid mar-
ket dislocations or an adverse impact on existing operations, the
composition of and the relationships among the international organ-
izations which will adminster the exploitation of the seabed, limitations
on the number of mine sites which can be granted to any person or
country in order to avoid a monopoly, a mechanism for review of the
deep seabed mining regime to ensure that its objectives are achieved,
compensation for developing countries suffering economic setbacks as
a result of deep seabed mining, and the qualification requirements and
selection procedures for applicants to mine the seabed.
Resolution of these issues is difficult for several reasons. The de-
veloping countries believe that the "common heritage of mankind"
concept means that mining privileges should be granted only if the es-
tablished relationship between the "International Seabed Authority"
and the miner will further the goals of the New International Economic
Order. Technology transfer to this Authority is a key factor in the G-
77 position. The industralized countries, however, recognizing that
seabed mining technology has been developed and is owned by private
industry, support the industry's position that any technology transfer
should take place only through free market commercial negotiations.
The industralized countries further contend that under existing
law deep seabed mining is a right, not a privilege. Their arguments
that international regulation could effectively deny all mining reaches a
receptive audience in a Congress which increasingly reflects an anti-
regulatory bias.80
Because commercial seabed mining is largely untested, most of the
protective provisions are phrased in highly technical language to guard
against possible contingencies. For example, a complex formula for
production controls to protect land-based mining operations has been
under discussion for two years even though there is no firm evidence
78 The outline of this approach is contained in Informal Negotiating Group Document
N67/20 (May 15, 1978).
79 ICNT, supra note 8, arts. 133-92.
80 The recent Administration efforts to deregulate airlines and the trucking industry has not
been opposed by Congress. The growth of regulations and government was a major campaign
issue during the 1978 elections.
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that seabed mining will be practicable or profitable, or that it will have
a significant impact on land-based mining operations.
Another category of difficult issues involves the administrative
branches of the International Seabed Authority: the Executive Coun-
cil, the General Assembly, the Technical, Economic and Planning
Commission, the Rules and Regulations Commission, the Seabed Dis-
pute Tribunal, and the Secretariat. Since the structure and power of
these bodies will control the operations of all other provisions, it is
likely that final negotiations regarding the composition relationships of
these bodies will be resolved near the conclusion of the negotiations.
The sheer size of the bureaucracy necessary to allay the fears of the 156
participating nations could prevent ratification by the U.S. Senate, in
view of recent criticism of our domestic bureaucracies. 8'
Finally, there is reluctance to finalize several key issues until the
entire package is near completion. An example of such hesitancy cen-
ters on the quota or anti-monopoly provisions sought by the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union, a producer of those minerals which will be
exploited from the seabed, does not want any one country dominating
the world mineral markets or holding rights to all the prime seabed
mining sites. The Soviets would like an anti-monopoly formula in-
cluded in the criteria for the issuance of licenses to mine the seabed, but
they have been reluctant to present specific proposals. Their reluctance
is due in part to the fact that as long as final agreement is delayed, the
issue can be used to gain leverage on other issues.
It is difficult to be optimistic about the chances for agreement on
the seabed issues. Few compromises sought in the past four meetings
have even approached the necessary consensus. One compromise ap-
proach currently discussed in intersessional meetings is the simplifica-
tion of the text, adopting only general concepts, and allowing technical
provisions to be drafted by the Authority or a special rules commission
when seabed mining is closer to commencement.
CONCLUSION
When the eighth session of the LOS conferences convened in
March 1979, House action had already begun. Senate action can be
expected to follow in fairly rapid order if the eighth session is inconclu-
sive. In its deliberations the Congress will be working from the follow-
ing premises which now appear to be accepted by a majority of the
81 Although the size of government is a traditional issue, presidential campaign promises to
reduce the size of government in 1976 and similar promises during the 1978 elections drew strong
voter support.
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members of both Houses of Congress as well as by the Administration.
1. While the Conference has made remarkable progess in the last
four years, the current language in the ICNT relating to seabed mining
is unacceptable to the necssary two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate.
No treaty is therefore possible unless this language is changed.
2. United States interests are better served by a comprehensive
LOS treaty than by early development of deep seabed minerals. How-
ever, if no treaty compromise is made by the G-77 nations, and thus no
U.S. ratification is possible, the United States might as well proceed
with unilateral action.
3. The Administration has signalled its support for a bill which
contains language preserving the so-called "common heritage of man-
kind" concept.
4. While unilateral action may effectively end further negotia-
tions and make a treaty impossible, there is at least a chance that the
present stalemate in Committee I could be broken if the G-77 realize
that the patience of the United States and other industralized countries
is at an end.
5. A majority of the members of the House and Senate believe
that unilateral legislation must be enacted. Years of hostile third world
rhetoric at the United Nations have caused a backlash against G-77
"demands."
As in other cases in recent history, the majority may well be
wrong. Without substantial change in position by the G-77, it seems a
certainty that the U.S. Congress will unilaterally enact a law licensing
U.S. citizens and their associates to mine the deep seabed. Only time
will tell what effect this legislation will have on the future of interna-
tional relations.
Addendum
As this article was going to press, the eighth session of the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference was adjourned without reaching an
agreement on a comprehensive treaty or resolving the deep seabed
mining issue.
The Editors
